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This paper analyses the interconnectedness between developing countries domestic wage
levels and their exchange rate choice. The theoretical model illustrates that diﬀerences in
domestic wage levels are related to countries’ exchange rate regimes. In particular, the level
of domestic wages increases with the rigidity of the exchange rate regime. The empirical
model explores the determinants of the domestic wage level in a cross-section of 38 developing
countries. In line with the theoretical model, the economies under consideration experience
a rise in the domestic wage level with an increase in the rigidity of their exchange rate
regime.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Diﬀerences in wage levels across countries are central to economic questions such as factor price
equalisation, the relative living standards or migration of labour across regions and countries. An
interesting ﬁnding in international economics is the empirical regularity that international wage
levels across countries are positively related to the level of real income per capita (see Freeman
and Oostendorp, 2000 as well as Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson, 1977).1 By relating the wage
setting behaviour to the exchange rate choice, this paper oﬀers a further explanation for diﬀering
wage levels across countries. In particular, the implications of the exchange rate regime choice on
the wage setting behaviour in developing countries is considered. So far, the ability of exchange
rate regimes to inﬂuence wage rates across developing countries has not been investigated in
much detail. Yet, the nominal exchange rate matters due to the presence of market distortions
such as sticky prices or wages.
The ﬁrst authors making their case for ﬂexible exchange rates are Friedman (1953) and
Mundell (1961). The authors argue that ﬂexible exchange rates act as a ‘shock absorber’, which
help to stabilise the economy when external shocks occur. In case of an external shock and
sticky goods prices or sticky wages it is easier to adjust the nominal exchange rate than to
wait until imbalances in the goods and labour market push the relative prices in the desired
direction. Consequently, a ﬂoating exchange rate insulates the economy against external shocks.
Additionally, a ﬂoating exchange rate allows a country’s monetary policy to become independent
of the nominal exchange rate. Thus, the country’s monetary policy can be used to respond to
real shocks which hit the economy.
Despite the importance of the exchange rate regime choice for developing countries, there is
relatively little empirical work addressing their eﬀects on domestic wage levels. Recent research
has predominantly focused on exchange rates and their impact on labour markets. Branson
and Love (1988) analyse exchange rate movements and manufacturing employment in the US.
Their ﬁnding is that real US dollar appreciations are associated with a decline in employment
in the durable goods sectors. Similarly, Gourinchas (1998) analyses exchange rate movements in
relation to changes in employment for the US. His main ﬁnding is that US dollar depreciations
lead to signiﬁcant positive changes in gross employment. Goldberg and Tracy (2001) concentrate
on the magnitude of wage sensitivity to movements in the US dollar. They establish that dollar
ﬂuctuations translate into more sensitive wages in the US. Little research has focused on exchange
rate regimes and their impact on domestic wage levels.
1One of the most common explanations for this relationship is based on the diﬀerences in labour productivity
across sectors and countries.
2This paper contributes to the existing literature by analysing the equilibrium eﬀect of the ex-
change rate regime choice on domestic wage levels in developing countries. The paper argues that
the exchange rate regime choice matters, since it inﬂuences the monetary authority’s response to
real shocks. Under ﬂoating exchange rates the monetary authority is able to accommodate real
shocks. When the nominal exchange rate is inﬂexible, the monetary authority is unable to oﬀset
real disturbances. This creates uncertainty about the level of macroeconomic variables, such as
consumption or labour supply. Consequently, households under ﬁxed exchange rates require a
wage premium relative to households under ﬂoating exchange rate regimes to compensate for
the presence of uncertainty in the economy. This might especially be true in countries with less
developed ﬁnancial markets where only a limited amount of assets is available to insure against
the consequences of real shocks. Especially developing countries have incomplete ﬁnancial mar-
kets and, therefore, do not participate in international risk sharing. Thus, to oﬀset uncertainty
households in developing countries might use wages as a principal insurance mechanism.
To provide a basis for the empirical analysis this paper uses a theoretical framework on
optimal wage setting under diﬀerent exchange rate regimes. In particular, a general equilibrium
approach is utilised to analyse a stochastic model with preset wages and imperfect competition.
The domestic country is subject to productivity shocks and has the choice to either peg or ﬂoat
its nominal exchange rate. A comparison between the two exchange rate regimes shows that
the monetary authority cannot resolve uncertainty about the level of macroeconomic variables
under a pegging exchange rate regime.2 This aﬀects the expected utility of households. The
more volatile the expected real shock the higher will be the expected utility costs. Households
take those expected utility costs into account when deciding about their preset wages. As a
consequence, households require a wage premium relative to households under ﬂoating exchange
rate regimes.
To empirically test the hypothesis that the level of wages increases with the rigidity of the
exchange rate regime, newly constructed data sets by Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) and
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2003) are utilised. The former authors transform the International Labour
Organisation’s (ILO) wage survey into a consistent data ﬁle on wage payment over the time period
1983 to 1998. Reinhart and Rogoﬀ develop a new approach to reclassify historical exchange rate
regimes over the period 1946 to 2001. Their de facto classiﬁcation will be compared with the
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions (AREAER, 2002), known as the de jure classiﬁcation. The comparison between
2This uncertainty argument was ﬁr s te s t a b l i s h e db yO b s t f e l da n dR o g o ﬀ (2000). A similar argument with
respect to diﬀering price levels across countries can be found in Broda (2003), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) as well
as Devereux and Engel (2000).
3the two approaches allows an empirical assessment of the paper’s hypothesis, using diﬀerent
exchange rate regime classiﬁcations.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The theoretical background, which
follows the recent new open economy macroeconomics literature, is delineated in the next section.
Section 3 discusses the data used and presents the empirical strategy. The empirical estimates
examine the determinants of the domestic wage level in a cross-section of developing economies,
using the exchange rate regime variable in conjunction with a set of control variables which
have been employed in the literature. Section 4 concludes by providing a brief summary of the
ﬁndings.
2 The Model
This section develops a stochastic new open economy macroeconomics model.3 It consists of
a small open economy, Home (H), and the rest of the world, named Foreign (F). The model
features optimising households, nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition. There is only
one period and no ex-ante trade in state contingent assets.4 Agents set their wage after the
exchange rate regime has been deﬁned. However, wages are set in advance before real shocks,
production and consumption are realised. Productivity shocks are the only possible disturbance.
Households then supply labour that ﬁrms demand once uncertainty is revealed and decide about
money balances and consumption. Production in each country takes place out of traded and
nontraded goods. The monetary policy is deﬁned to be one with commitment. This is a reason-
able assumption since the systematic component is more important than the surprise element
in monetary policy (Lane, 2002). It is assumed that the monetary authority can observe the
productivity shock, k, after wages are set and then sets the money supply in response.
Preferences, Consumption Indexes and Firms
There is a continuum of economic agents, indexed by i [0,1]. For each agent i the periodic
utility function is given by







Households associate utility beneﬁts from the consumption index C(i), from holding real balances
M(i)
P and disutility from the obligation to supply labour eﬀort, L(i), to the traded and nontraded
3See also Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Devereux (2002) as well as Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000). For a survey
on the new open economy macroeconomics literature see Lane (2001).
4Lewis (1996) provides empirical evidence for this assumption. The main conclusions do not depend on the
absence of dynamics.
4good ﬁrms. The elasticity of marginal disutility from work eﬀort is given by ν − 1,w h e r eν>1.
The assumption that ν>1 ensures that the labour supply schedule is downward sloping. In
general, a rise in ν makes the labour supply more inelastic. A random shift in the marginal
disutility of work eﬀort, k>0, can be seen as an inverse national productivity shock which
aﬀects productivity in the traded and nontraded sector equally.5 A shock to productivity reﬂects
the uncertainty in the model.
Total labour eﬀort, L(i), is given by labour eﬀort in the home traded good sector, LH(i,z),
and nontraded sector, LN(i,z). Each household acts as a monopolistic supplier of a variety of





0 LN(i,z)dz. The nominal wage in the two sectors is deﬁned as
W(i). While wages are preset, prices of all goods are completely ﬂexible and can be changed in
response to market conditions. Foreign agents, (F), have symmetric preferences and are denoted
by ∗.A g e n t(i) faces the ex post budget constraint:
PC(i)+M(i) − M0 = T + W(i)(LH(i,z)+LN(i,z)) + Π(i), (2)
where Π(i) denotes total proﬁts and T = M(i) − M0 are per capita transfers in nominal terms.
The household receives the proﬁts, Π(i), from the ownership of the ﬁrm. M0 reﬂects the initial
money holdings in the economy. Note that PC(i)=PHCH(i)+PFCF(i)+PNCN(i). For any
household i the overall consumption index is given by C(i)=CT(i)
γCN(i)
1−γ. The implica-
tion of the consumption index is that the intratemporal elasticity of substitution equals unity.
The parameter 0 <γ<1 represents the preference for the traded good CT. CT reﬂects the
consumption of tradable goods, CT(i)=CH(i)
ηCF(i)
1−η. The relative preferences between the
home produced good, CH(i), and foreign produced traded good, CF(i), are reﬂected by the
parameter 0 <η<1. The nontraded consumption is characterised by CN(i). The consumption


















F. Maximising the objective function (1) subject to equation (2) and the trade balance






















CT(i) hold. The production
5As in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000), the variable L(i) denotes eﬃcient labour rather than the hours worked,
H(i). As a consequence, H(i)=k
1
ν L(i). Hence, technology is labour augmenting. A negative productivity shock,
ar i s ei nk, allows the household to produce less in a given amount of time.
5technology of a ﬁxed unit mass of ﬁrms in the traded, YH(i)=LH(i), and nontraded goods














. The foreign country has similar linear production technolo-
gies. Labour is diﬀerentiated across households and each household works for each ﬁrm in the
two sectors. LH(i) and LN(i) are the aggregate of the individual labour supply in the two sectors.
The elasticity of substitution between any two heterogeneous workers equals θ>1.T h er e s o u r c e







0 CN(i)di.P r o ﬁts of the ﬁrms in the traded and nontraded sectors are
deﬁned by πH(z)=PHYH(i)−
R 1
0 W(i)LH(i,z)dz and πN(z)=PNYN(i)−
R 1
0 W(i)LN(i,z)dz.
The implicit labour demand schedule in the traded and nontraded good sector can be derived














Optimisation and the Optimal Preset Wage
Given the proﬁt income from the ownership of the ﬁr m sa sw e l la sp r i c e sa n dp r e s e tw a g e s ,t h e
household (i) would like to divide income between consumption and money holdings. Maximising
the utility function, equation (1), subject to the budget constraint outlined in equation (2), the
ﬁrst order conditions for consumption and nominal money balances are obtained: 1
PC(i) = λ,
and 1
M(i) = λ. 1
λ measures the marginal utility of nominal wealth. The optimal consumption
is inﬂuenced by real money holdings. Since money has a value only for the current period,





Each household supplies labour to the traded and nontraded goods sector and faces downward
sloping demand curves which are given by equation (4). Household (i) does not know the state
of economy. Therefore, he chooses its preset wage to maximise expected utility. The agents meet
the demand they face at the preset wage once uncertainty is resolved. The optimal wage can be
derived from the maximisation of equation (1) in expected terms subject to equations (2) and









6Here the subscript (i) is ignored.
6The right-hand side of equation (6) shows that households set their wages equal to the marginal
costs of supplying an additional unit of labour relative to the marginal utility of consuming
an additional unit of goods, PC = M,a n dt h em a r k u p θ
θ−1. The marginal costs depend on






(θ − 1), has to equal the expected utility cost from higher work eﬀort,
E−1(kLν)
W θ.
The cost of higher work eﬀort increases in expected labour supply, E−1 (Lν).C o n s e q u e n t l y ,t h e
incentive to reduce wages is smaller when labour is more volatile. A rise in productivity, a fall
in k, reduces the marginal costs and stimulates output.
Equilibrium
The equilibrium for any monetary policy rule is represented by the goods market clearing
in the home, LH = ηγ P
PH (C + C∗) and LN =( 1− γ) P
PN C,a sw e l la sf o r e i g nc o u n t r y ,L∗
F =
(1 − η)γ P
SP∗
F (C + C∗), utility maximisation by households and a balanced government budget.7
The closed form solution of the rational expectation equilibrium of the model for a given path






















W PH = PN = W


















M∗, has implications for the choice of the
exchange rate regime: Although η is parametric, it is assumed temporarily that it could vary.
Af a l li nη implies a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Under a peg the monetary
authority has to respond procyclically to movements in the preference parameter η. Hence, a
contractionary monetary policy is necessary to overcome the rise in the nominal exchange rate.
T h es a m ei st r u ef o rad e c l i n ei nt h er e s to ft h ew o r l d ’ sm o n e ys u p p l y ,M∗.N o r e s p o n s e i s
required to a productivity shock k.8 Under ﬂoats the economy is independent of external shocks
since the nominal exchange rate insulates the economy against movements in η and M∗.F o r
the remaining part of the analysis η remains parametric and M∗ =1i st h es a m ef o rc o u n t r yH,
regardless of its choice to ﬂoat or peg its nominal exchange rate.
7Using equation (3) it can be shown that PHYH = γPC = PT CT h o l d s . T h es a m ei st r u ef o rt h ef o r e i g n
country such that (1 − η)CT = ηC∗
T. The implication is that the consumption levels of traded goods are in
constant proportion to each other.
8It is assumed that k and k∗ are uncorrelated.








ν, depends on the distribution
of the money stock in relation to productivity. Money supply, M, can be expressed as a log-linear
transformation of k,a n d ,t h e r e f o r e ,al o g n o r m a ld i s t r i b ution of the two variables is assumed,
whereby the mean value of logk = κ, E−1(κ), and logM = m, E−1(m), is assumed to equal





















A rise in the volatility of the money supply, reﬂected by its variance σ2
m > 0, will increase the
equilibrium nominal wage. This is due to the fact that the household likes to keep its expected
labour supply, E−1 (Lν), constant. According to the equilibrium labour supply equation, L = M
W ,
labour increases linearly with the nominal money supply. Hence, households attach more weight
to high values of money than to low ones. They set higher nominal preset wages, the more
money is volatile. Furthermore, a negative covariance between productivity and money supply,
σκ,m < 0, provides a hedge against the uncertain realisation of the productivity shock. Since
r e a lw a g e st e n dt ob eh i g hw h e np r o d u c t i v i t yi s low, households set a lower nominal wage when
the covariance is negative. A higher variance in the productivity shock k, σ2
κ > 0,i n c r e a s e st h e
expected utility costs from work eﬀort and, hence, wages in the economy.
Wage Diﬀerentials under diﬀe r e n tE x c h a n g eR a t eR e g i m e s
In order to assess whether the equilibrium level of wages diﬀers with the exchange rate regime
choice the monetary policy rules have to be deﬁned.
Under a ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m et h em o n e t a r yp o l i c yr u l ee q u a l sMPeg = M0,s ot h a tt h e
money stock remains constant.
Given the equilibrium nominal exchange rate a constant money stock reﬂects the optimal
response of the monetary authority under a ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m et ot h ep r o d u c t i v i t y
shock, k. Consequently, the monetary authority cannot respond to any productivity shock and
t h ec o v a r i a n c eb e t w e e nt h em o n e ys t o c ka n dp r o d u c t i v i t y ,cov(κ,m)=σκ,m, equals zero.
Under ﬂoating exchange rates the monetary policy is independent of the nominal exchange
rate and can decide on an eﬃcient monetary policy rule that accommodates the real shock in
the economy. An eﬃcient monetary policy rule, deﬁned here as replicating the ﬂexible wage
equilibrium, reacts procyclically to changes in productivity so that M0(k) < 0 and M00(k) > 0.10
9The random vector X
¯
=( X1,...,XN) is normally distributed with a mean vector µ and a variance-covariance





















10See also Ireland (1996) and Kim and Henderson (2002).
8In particular an optimal monetary policy rule under ﬂoating exchange rates is mirrored in the
following assumption:
In a ﬂoating exchange rate economy the monetary authority responds to the productivity
shock, k, and adjusts its money stock as follows: MFloat = M0
k
1
ν ,w h e r eM0
Float(k) < 0 and
M00
Float(k) > 0.
The monetary authority adopts a procyclical monetary policy under ﬂoats when responding
t oap r o d u c t i v i t ys h o c k . 11 I tf o l l o w st h a tt h ec o v a r i a n c eb e t w e e nt h ed o m e s t i cm o n e ys u p p l ya n d
productivity shock must be negative, so that cov(κ,m)=σκ,m < 0. The negative covariance
between productivity and money supply, σκ,m, provides a hedge against the uncertain occurrence
of the productivity shock. More precisely, the monetary policy rule oﬀsets the productivity
shock in the ﬂoating exchange rate economy and resolves uncertainty in this country. Thus, the
monetary policy rules aﬀect the expected level of utility under the two exchange rate regimes.
Proposition 1 The expected utility is higher under ﬂoating exchange rates than under ﬁxed
exchange rates: E−1 (UFloat) >E −1 (UPeg).












. The equilibrium consumption, C, the price level, P, and labour
supply, L, are already deﬁned. Substituting M under ﬂoats with MFloat = M0
k
1
ν and using the fact























provides the expected utility level under ﬂoating exchange rates:
E−1 (UFloat)=zC +l o g
h
γnγ (1 − γ)
1−γ
i
+l o gM0 −
Ã









Under pegs the monetary rule equals MPeg = M0. Thus, the expected utility under ﬁxed
exchange rates reads
E−1 (UPeg)=zC +l o g[ γnγ (1 − γ)
nγ]+l o gM0 −
Ã













The diﬀerence between equation (7) and (8) reﬂects the expected relative welfare gains under
11In the ﬂexible wage equilibrium the equilibrium labour supply condition holds in any state of nature and




























ν . That is, under ﬂexible wages the equilibrium
labour supply is only aﬀected by ﬂuctuations that would arise in a ﬂexible wage world. The uncertainty is
resolved in a ﬂexible wage world.
9ﬂoating exchange rates:
E−1 (UFloat) − E−1 (UPeg)=( 1− γ (1 − η))σ2
κ > 0.
This establishes the claim made in Proposition 1.
The relative welfare gains under a ﬂoating exchange rate regime increase in the variance of
the productivity shock, k. In other words, the relative expected utility under ﬁxed exchange
rates declines with the volatility of the productivity shock. Proposition 1 illustrates that a
procyclical monetary policy becomes the optimal response in relative welfare terms when pro-
ductivity changes and wages are preset. A procyclical change in the domestic money stock under
ﬂoating exchange rates accommodates the productivity shock and eliminates uncertainty in the
economy. Thereby it stabilises expected consumption and minimises the expected ﬂuctuations
in labour supply. This eliminates the expected utility costs from the presence of uncertainty.
Consequently, the ﬂoating exchange rate economy experiences a higher expected level of utility
relative to the ﬁxed exchange rate regime. As a precurser to the empirical analysis, the wage
level of the domestic country is deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 1 The domestic wage level equals the average domestic wage level expressed in for-
eign currency, S. Hence, the domestic wage level is equivalent to




Deﬁnition 1 compares the cost of labour, expressed by wages, across countries, and will be
used in the empirical part to analyse diﬀerences in the wage level under diﬀerent exchange rate
regimes.12
From the monetary policy rule MPeg it becomes clear that the monetary authority does not
respond to any changes in productivity under ﬁxed exchange rates. Accordingly, no correlation
between money stock, M, and the productivity shock, k, occurs. The monetary authority does
not allow to hedge against the uncertain realisation of the productivity shock and, therefore
cannot resolve uncertainty. Under a ﬂo a t i n ge x c h a n g er a t er e g i m et he monetary authority’s
purpose is to accommodate the productivity shock. It follows that the covariance between the
domestic money supply and productivity shock must be negative, so that cov(κ,m)=σκ,m < 0.
As a result, the monetary rule resolves uncertainty in the economy.
Proposition 2 The expected domestic wage level under
1. ﬁxed exchange rates rises with the variance of the productivity shock, σ2
κ.
2. ﬂoating exchange rates is independent of the productivity shock.
12A similar terminology has been applied in the empirical literature on price levels. See Rogers (2001) among
others.
10Proof. To derive part 1 of Proposition 2, it is assumed that households under ﬁxed exchange
rates take the monetary policy rule under pegs into account when deciding about their preset
























The claim made in part 1 of Proposition 2 immediately follows from equation (9).
To establish part 2 of Proposition 2, recall that households account for the monetary rule un-





























Equation (10) establishes the claim made in part 2 of Proposition 2.
As the monetary authority maintains a ﬁxed exchange rate it cannot oﬀset productivity
disturbances. This creates uncertainty, σ2
κ, in the economy and causes utility costs to ﬂuctuate
with the productivity disturbance (see equation (8)). Since wages are preset households cannot
adjust wages after the productivity shock has occurred. Consequently, to be compensated for
the volatility of the productivity shock households under ﬁxed exchange rates require a wage
premium, denoted by σ2
κ. Since the monetary authority resolves uncertainty under a ﬂoating
exchange rate regime, households do not require any compensation for the presence of uncertainty
through wages. As a result, the expected domestic wage is constant under ﬂoating exchange
rate regimes. Applying Proposition 2, the diﬀerence between equation (9) and (10) shows that
the relative wage diﬀerential, E−1 (logDWLPeg) − E−1 (logDWLFloat)=
σ2
κ
2ν , depends on the
magnitude of uncertainty.13 The intuition for this result is that a ﬁxed exchange rate economy
adopts a passive monetary policy rule relative to the ﬂoating exchange rate economy, which
causes the expected utility costs to ﬂuctuate with the productivity shock, k, under pegs. To
be compensated for this, households require a wage premium relative to ﬂoating exchange rate
economies. Hence, the following corollary should hold:
Corollary 1 The equilibrium domestic wage level increases with the inﬂexibility of the exchange
rate regime. Consequently, E−1 (logDWLPeg) >E −1 (logDWLFloat).
13At this point it is worth to note that the results derived are also valid for an external shock in form of η or
a foreign money supply shock, M∗. A proof is available on request from the author.
113 Empirical Evidence
This section attempts to empirically assess Corollary 1 by presenting the statistical inference of
developing countries’ wage level in relation to their adopted exchange rate regime. The paper
concentrates on the period 1983 to 1998. The sample consists of 38 developing countries (see
Table 1).
Data
To obtain a measure of the level of domestic wages across developing countries, this paper
explores Freeman and Oostendorp’s (2000) occupational wage data set. The authors transform
the survey of wages, conducted by the ILO, into a consistent data ﬁle on pay in 161 occupations
from 1983 to 1998. Since speciﬁc occupations vary across countries and years, a comparison
between exactly the same occupation across countries would reduce the sample size too much.
Thus, this paper takes another approach and calculates a yearly average of a country’s domestic
wage level. Observations on wages are treated as samples from the distribution of occupational
wages for each country, rather than as estimates of wages for a speciﬁcoc c u p a t i o n . 14 To construct
an average wage rate of a country in a particular year, this paper concentrates on countries that
report on the same occupations over time.15 To analyse diﬀerences in wage levels across exchange
rate regimes, the level of domestic wages is expressed in terms of a single currency, namely the
US dollar. The deﬂated wages allow to capture the cost of labour across countries.
Two exchange rate classiﬁcations are explored in the empirical analysis. This paper follows
the recent work by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2003) and the IMF’s AREAER (2002) to classify
the exchange rate regimes of the 38 developing countries of interest. The AREAER report is
based on the publicly stated commitment of the authorities in the countries in question. This
approach is known as the de jure analysis and will be compared with the de facto classiﬁcation
by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ. The authors utilise market-determined parallel exchange rates. The
two classiﬁcations form the basis of the following empirical analysis. The de facto approach
uses the ﬁne classiﬁcation codes by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ, so that the most rigid peg is denoted
by 1 and the most ﬂexible exchange rate regime by 14. The IMF classiﬁes eight exchange rate
regimes. Similar to the de facto classiﬁcation, the most rigid exchange rate arrangement equals
1a n dt h em o s tﬂexible equals 8 in the de jure classiﬁcation.
14This paper treats occupations as units of observations. This assumption is valid as long as one is concerned
with the structure of wages. However, it is true that the distribution of occupational wages will diﬀer from the
distribution of individual wages if occupations have diﬀerent amounts of employees (see Freeman and Oostendorp,
2000).
15For example, if Mexico consistently reports on 23 occupations over time, only these 23 occupation codes are
used. On average the analysed countries report 50 occupations per year. Wages are expressed per 1000 US $.
12Additionally, a set of control variables is introduced. The literature on factor price equalisa-
tion deﬁnes income levels as the key determinant for diﬀerences in factor prices across countries
(see for example Balassa, 1964). Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) establish that domestic wage
levels tend to rise with the level of income per capita. To control for diﬀering income levels
across developing countries the variable GDP per capita is added to the regressional analysis.
It is measured in constant US dollars and taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI,
2002).16
A further control variable is the extent to which a country trades. The theorem by Stolper
and Samuelson (1941) predicts that countries with high trade shares should experience a factor
price equalisation towards the world average. Thus, trade lowers the relative dispersion in wages
between less developed countries with relatively low levels of skills. The trade theory also allows
factor prices to diﬀer if countries operate under diﬀerent technologies or degrees of competition.
To capture the degree of openness to trade, the paper utilises the ratio of exports of goods and
services relative to GDP (WDI, 2002) as an openness measure.
To account for macroeconomic heterogeneity of countries, an additional control variable is
introduced. The size of a country is particularly important. Larger countries may be less
vulnerable to real shocks, due to diversiﬁed production. However, a small open country may
be able to adjust to changes in the macroeconomic environment more quickly and ﬂexibly. A
country’s exchange rate regime choice is also linked to its size, since small countries may ﬁnd it
easier to lock onto a large one, than would two countries of similar size. The country’s size is
measured by total GDP, which is obtained from the WDI (2002).17
The empirical model also controls for macroeconomic fundamentals across countries. There-
fore, the volatility of money supply and the rate of inﬂation in the economy will be added to
the regression analysis. Including the rate of inﬂation in the empirical model allows to capture
a possible output-inﬂation trade-oﬀ.T h e r a t e o f i n ﬂation relates the level of domestic wages
to changes in prices. If price inﬂation is too high, (preset) domestic wage levels should decline
and vice versa. The volatility of money might account for the stance of the monetary pol-
icy across countries. Especially countries which try to target inﬂation should experience a less
volatile money stock. If the monetary authority aims at not only targeting inﬂation but also
unemployment money supply becomes less stable over time. This should inﬂuence expectations
and the domestic wage level of countries. The volatility of money supply is calculated by a ﬁve
16In the empirical analysis similar results are obtained, when the real GDP per capita measure by the Penn
World Table 5.6. is used.
17An alternative measure of country size would be total population. Applying this variable in the empirical
analysis does not change the main results of the paper.
13year rolling standard deviation of the monetary aggregate M2, utilising the IMF International
Financial Statistics (IFS, 2001). The rate of inﬂation is obtained from the WDI (2002).
A ﬁrst diagnostic of the data is provided in Table 2, where the summary statistic diﬀerentiates
between ﬁxed, intermediate and ﬂoating exchange rate regimes.18 T h ed ef a c t oa n dd ej u r e
classiﬁcation show that, on average, developing countries with an intermediate exchange rate
regime have higher domestic wage levels. On average, ﬁxed exchange rate regimes have less
volatile domestic wage levels than ﬂoating and intermediate regimes. Concentrating on GDP
per capita, developing countries with an intermediate or ﬂoating exchange rate provide evidence
for smaller deviations of GDP per capita. To investigate the empirical relationship between the
domestic wage level and exchange rate regimes across developing countries in more detail the
next section continues with a regressional analysis.
Cross-Sectional Analysis
The theoretical priors suggest an equilibrium relationship between the domestic wage level
and the exchange rate regime choice of developing countries. Therefore, a cross-sectional ap-
proach is utilised over the time period 1983 to 1998. This type of approach abstracts itself from
short-run ﬂuctuations of the macroeconomic variables. The cross-sectional analysis also deals
with the potential criticism that the results obtained only reﬂect the short-run eﬀects of changes
i nt h ee x c h a n g er a t er e g i m eo nt h el e v e lo fd o m e s t i cw a g e s .F o re x a m p l e ,t h ee c o n o m i cp e r f o r -
mance that may arise from a sudden regime shift, for instance a collapse of the currency, may be
wrongly assigned to the ﬂoating exchange rate regime although it is the result of the preceding
periods of the regime change. The cross-sectional approach circumvents this by averaging the
exchange rate variable over the period 1983 to 1998. The cross-sectional analysis allows also to
focus on the level of variables, as suggested by the general equilibrium model outlined in the
previous section.19 Accordingly, the basic speciﬁcation of the regression analysis can be written
as follows:
DWLi = α + βyi + γOpeni + δExRi + ψ
0Xi+εi (11)
DWL is the wage level of country i, expressed in a common currency. First, DWLi is regressed
18For the IMF classiﬁcation the paper follows Frankel (1999). He categorises exchange rate regimes into three
types: Currency unions, currency boards and truly ﬁxed exchange rates can be speciﬁed as ﬁxed exchange rates.
Intermediate regimes comprise crawling pegs (adjustable pegs, crawling pegs and basket pegs) and dirty ﬂoats
(target zone/bands or managed ﬂoats). Free ﬂoats represent a pure ﬂoat regime. A similar approach has been
taken for the de facto classiﬁcation by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2003).
19Most of the existing literature on exchange rate regimes follows the prediction of the Dornbusch-Mundell-
Fleming model and concentrates on changes and volatilities in the variables.
14on the log of GDP per Capita, yi, the exchange rate variable, ExRi and the openness measure,
Openi. Second, size is added to the regressional analysis. Lastly, volatility of money and inﬂation
are introduced. The last three regressors are included in the vector Xi. All variables are simple
averages over the period 1983 to 1998. Results of White’s (1980) test for heteroskedasticity in the
residuals from the OLS regression provide some evidence for the presence of heteroskedasticity.
The standard errors are therefore obtained from White’s consistent covariance matrix.
De Jure Classiﬁcation The estimation of the domestic wage level equation depicts a
negative relationship between the exchange rate regime variable and the average level of domestic
wages across countries throughout columns (1) to (3) of Table 3. The more rigid the exchange
rate regime, the higher the average domestic wage level of developing countries. The estimated
δ parameter of the exchange rate regime variable, ExRi, is statistically signiﬁcant when the
standard control variables and volatility of money and inﬂation are added. In line with the
theoretical predictions, the average domestic wage level increases the less ﬂexible the exchange
rate regime is.
A negative relationship between wages and the ﬂexibility of the exchange rate regime exists
when variations in wealth and openness across developing countries are controlled for. The
estimated β parameter of GDP per capita is statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level. The
three variables are able to explain 42 percent of the variations in the data. The point coeﬃcient
of 0.09 means that a 10 percent improvement in the average domestic GDP per capita raises the
average domestic wage level by 0.9 percentage points. The estimated openness coeﬃcient, γ,i s
also statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level. A 10 percentage point increase in a country’s
openness raises the domestic wage level by 0.02 percentage points. Thus, a higher trade share
increases the overall wage level. This might oﬀer some support for the Stolper and Samuelson
theorem, which predicts that more open developing economies should experience a factor price
equalisation towards the world average. When controlling for macroeconomic heterogeneity, the
exchange rate regime coeﬃcient, δ, remains negative in sign and statistically signiﬁcant at the
ﬁve percent level (column (2)). The volatility of money and inﬂation, column (3), enter the
regression analysis with positive signs. Controlling for the stance of monetary policy reduces
the point estimate of the exchange rate variable. However, the estimated exchange rate regime
coeﬃcient remains statistically signiﬁcant and negative in sign. The estimated positive coeﬃcient
on volatility of money stock implies that a more volatile money stock increases the domestic wage
level in developing countries.
The ﬁndings for the de jure classiﬁcation can be summarised as follows: The exchange rate
regime variable plays an important role in explaining the domestic wage level across developing
15countries. When controlling for variations in wealth, openness and size as well as money volatil-
ity and inﬂation, wages are positively aﬀected by the rigidity of the nominal exchange rate,
which conﬁrms the theoretical priors discussed above. Consider two developing countries with
distinct, however, closely related exchange rate regimes (i.e. the countries would for example
have exchange rate regimes deﬁned as 3 and 4 or 6 and 7). If the countries exhibit the same
size, income level and degree of openness, the average monthly wage diﬀerential per year will be
approximately 37 US $.
Columns (4)-(6) of Table 3 present results on upper middle income economies, which should
exhibit a more advanced wage setting behaviour.20 Thus, a more pronounced relationship be-
t w e e nt h ee x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ec h o i c ea n dt h el e v e lo fd o m e s t i cw a g e si nt h i sg r o u po fc o u n t r i e s
should be expected. The exchange rate regime variable, ExRi, has a negative association with
the level of domestic wages in upper middle income developing countries. The estimated ExRi
coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant throughout columns (4) to (6). As for the complete devel-
oping country sample, the estimated negative exchange rate coeﬃcient implies that the average
domestic wage level in upper middle income economies is higher when the exchange rate regime
is more rigid. Overall, the results obtained are in line with the ﬁndings for the complete devel-
oping country sample, when macroeconomic heterogeneity, volatility of money and inﬂation are
controlled for. Controlling for macroeconomic fundamentals does not add explanatory power to
the empirical model but increases the point estimate of the ExRi coeﬃcient. Now two middle
income economies with distinct but closely related exchange rate regimes are considered. Given
that the countries exhibit the same size, income level and degree of openness the average monthly
wage diﬀerential per year will be approximately 90 US $. Hence, the wage diﬀerential is more
pronounced than for the complete developing country sample.
De Facto Classiﬁcation The de jure approach constitutes the uncertainty of not know-
ing whether the actual policy in the country is consistent with the commitment stated in the
AREAER. Thus, the results obtained above are compared to the de facto classiﬁcation, which
attempts to capture the actual exchange rate regime behaviour of countries. Columns (1) to (3)
of Table 4 report the results for the complete developing country sample. Allowing for variations
in the level of wealth and openness, wages are higher in developing countries the more rigid
the exchange rate regime is. Throughout columns (1) to (3) the estimated coeﬃcient on GDP
per capita enters the regression speciﬁcation with a statistically signiﬁcant positive sign. This
20Upper middle income economies are deﬁned, utilising country classiﬁcation code by the WDI (2002). The
following countries are included: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Gabon,
Hungary, Mauritius, Mexico, Slovakia, South Korea, Latvia, Uruguay and Venezuela. Singapore is also included.
Excluding Singapore from the sample does not change the statistical results.
16indicates that richer countries tend to have higher domestic wage levels. Similarly, as for the de
jure speciﬁcation, the degree of openness inﬂuences domestic wage levels positively. Including
size, volatility of money stock and inﬂation improves the explanatory power of the empirical
model (see column (3)). 40 percent of the variations in the data are explained by the statistical
speciﬁcation. The statistically signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient on the volatility of money illustrates
that the domestic wage level of developing countries rises the more volatile the money supply
is. Overall, the results obtained conﬁrm the ﬁndings of the de jure classiﬁcation. Similar to
t h ed ej u r ec l a s s i ﬁcation, a negative relationship between the exchange rate regime variable and
the average level of domestic wages across countries is established. However, compared to the
de jure classiﬁc a t i o nt h ee x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ec o e ﬃcient loses its statistical signiﬁcance in the
developing country samples in columns (1) to (3).
Turning to the sub-sample of upper middle income economies in columns (4) to (6) of Ta-
ble 4 a statistically signiﬁcant negative relationship between the domestic wage level and the
exchange rate regime variable is established. Thus, upper middle income economies experience
higher domestic wage levels when their exchanger a t er e g i m eb e c o m e sm o r er i g i d .W h e nc o n s i d -
ering two middle income economies with distinct, however, closely related exchange rate regimes
the average monthly wage diﬀerential per year will be approximately 38 US $ if the countries
exhibit the same income level and degree of openness. Compared to the de jure speciﬁcation
the estimated coeﬃcient on openness loses its statistical signiﬁcance, even though it remains
positive in sign. As for the overall sample, upper middle income countries with higher wealth
per capita experience a higher domestic wage level. Including volatility of money and inﬂation
to the regression analysis does not improve the explanatory power of the model but leaves the
e s t i m a t e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ec o e ﬃcient statistically signiﬁcant and negative in sign. Overall,
the regressional analysis conﬁrms the theoretical priors that the domestic wage level increases
with the inﬂexibility of the exchange rate regime.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper examines the eﬀects of the exchange rate regime choice on the domestic wage level
in developing countries. In addition to existing research, it explicitly illustrates that diﬀerent
exchange rate regimes can inﬂuence the domestic wage level of countries. The question posed in
this paper is analysed in two steps: First, a formal model investigates the relationship between
the exchange rate regime choice and the domestic wage level. Second, an empirical analysis of
developing countries sheds light on the theoretical ﬁndings that the domestic wage level increases
with the inﬂexibility of the exchange rate regime.
17The theoretical model adopts a general equilibrium approach to oﬀer a possible explanation
for diﬀering wage levels across exchange rate regimes. The model illustrates that a ﬁxed exchange
rate regime creates uncertainty about the level of macroeconomic variables and thereby reduces
the relative expected utility under ﬁxed exchange rates. The presence of uncertainty translates
into higher expected utility costs under ﬁxed exchange rate regimes. Households take those
expected utility costs into account when deciding about their preset wage and require a wage
premium relative to households under ﬂoating exchange rate regimes.
In the light of the theoretical ﬁndings, the paper empirically analyses the relationship be-
tween the domestic wage level and the exchange rate regime choice in developing countries over
the time period 1983 to 1998. The empirical ﬁndings show that the exchange rate regime plays
a statistically signiﬁcant role in explaining wage levels across countries. Using a number of stan-
dard control variables, such as GDP per capita, openness and size, wage levels are signiﬁcantly
negatively aﬀected by the ﬂexibility of the exchange rate regime. Hence, domestic wage levels
increase with the rigidity of the exchange rate regime.
Overall, the paper indicates that the choice of the exchange rate regime has an important
impact on economic performance by inﬂuencing macroeconomic variables, such as the level of
domestic wages, in developing countries. More precisely, the paper ﬁnds that the choice of the
exchange rate regime matters for developing countries. It provides empirical evidence for a
wage premium in ﬁxed relative to ﬂoating exchange rate regimes. So far the literature on factor
price equalisation has concentrated on real GDP per capita as the principal determinant for
diﬀerences in factor prices across countries. This paper shows that the exchange rate regime
variable can also signiﬁcantly inﬂuence wage levels of countries. Hence, future research could
incorporate diﬀerences in exchange rate regimes into the explanations for diﬀering factor prices
across countries.
18References
[1] Balassa, B. (1964), ”The Purchasing Power Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal”, Journal of
Political Economy 72: 584-596.
[2] Branson, W. and Love, J. (1988), ”United States Manufacturing and the Real Exchange
Rate”, in: Misalignment of Exchange Rates: Eﬀects on Trade and Industry,e d i t e db y
Marston, R., University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
[3] Broda, C. (2003), ”Exchange Rate Regimes and National Price Levels”, mimeo, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.
[4] Campa, J. and Goldberg, L. (2002), ”Employment versus Wage Adjustment and the US
Dollar”, Review of Economics and Statistics,f o r t h c o m i n g .
[5] Corsetti, G. and Pesenti, P. (2002), ”International Dimensions of optimal Monetary Policy”,
NBER Working Paper 8230.
[6] Devereux, M. (2002), ”Is the Exchange Rate a Shock Absorber? Evaluating the Case for
ﬂexible Exchange Rates”, mimeo, University of British Columbia.
[7] Devereux, M. and Engel, C. (2000), ”Monetary Policy in the open Economy Revisited: Price
Setting and Exchange rate Flexibility”, NBER Working Paper 7665.
[8] Dornbusch, R., Fischer, S. and Samuelson, P.A. (1977), ”Comparative Advantage, Trade,
and Payments in a Ricardian Model with a continuum of Goods”, American Economic
Review 67: 823-839.
[9] Frankel, J.A. (1999), ”No Single Currency Regime is Right for all Countries or at all Times”,
NBER Working Paper 7338.
[10] Freeman, R.B. and Oostendorp, R.H (2000), ”Wages around the World: Pay across Occu-
pations and Countries”, NBER Working Paper 8058.
[11] Friedman, M. (1953), ”The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates”, in: Essays in Positive
Economics, University of Chicago, Chicago.
[12] Goldberg, L. and Tracy, J. (2001), ” Exchange Rates and Wages”, NBER Working Paper
5874.
[13] Gourinchas, P.O. (1998), ” Exchange Rates and Jobs: What do we learn from Job Flows?”
NBER Macroeconomics Annual: 153-208.
19[14] International Monetary Fund (2001), International Financial Statistics: CD-Rom,W a s h -
ington.
[15] International Monetary Fund (2002), Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Ex-
change Restrictions, Washington.
[16] Ireland, P.N. (1996), ”The Role of Countercyclical Monetary Policy”, Journal of Political
Economy 104: 704-723.
[17] Lane, P.R. (2001), ”The New Open Macroeconomics: A Survey”, Journal of International
Economics 54: 235-266.
[18] Lane, P.R. (2002), ”Discussion of “Net Foreign Assets and the Exchange Rate: Redux
Revived” by Michele Cavallo and Fabio Ghironi”, Journal of Monetary Economics,f o r t h -
coming.
[19] Kim, J. and Henderson, D.W. (2002), ”Inﬂation Targeting and Nominal Income Growth
Targeting: When and Why are they Suboptimal?”, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System International Finance Discussion Papers 719.
[20] Lewis, K. (1996), ”What Can Explain the Apparent Lack of International Consumption
Risk Sharing?” Journal of Political Economy 104: 267-97.
[21] Mundell, R.A. (1961), ”A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas”, American Economic Re-
view 51: 657-665.
[22] Obstfeld, M. and Rogoﬀ, K. (2000) ”New Directions for Stochastic Open Economy Models”,
Journal of International Economics 50: 117-153.
[23] Reinhart, C. M. and Rogoﬀ, K. (2003), ”The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrange-
ments: A Reinterpretation”, NBER Working Paper 8963.
[24] Rogers, J. H. (2001), ”Price Level Convergence, relative Prices and Inﬂa t i o ni nE u r o p e ” ,
mimeo, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
[25] Stolper, W. and Samuelson, P.A. (1941), ”Protection and Wages”, Review of Economics
and Statistics 9: 58-73.
[26] White, H. (1980), “A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a
Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity”, Econometrica 48: 817-838.
[27] World Bank (2002) World Development Indicators CD-Rom, Washington.
20Developing Country Sample
Algeria Dominican Republic Mexico Surinam
Antigua and Barbuda Gabon Myanmar Thailand
Argentina Honduras Nicaragua Togo
Bolivia Hungary Niger Tunisia
Cameroon India Peru Turkey
Central African Republic Korea (South) Philippines Uruguay
Chile Latvia Romania Venezuela
China Madagascar Singapore Zambia
Costa Rica Mali Slovakia
Czech Republic Mauritius Sri Lanka
Table 1: Country List.
Variables De Facto Classiﬁcation De Jure Classiﬁcation
Mean StDev Max Min Mean StDev Max Min
Developing Countries:
Fixed Exchange Rate:
DWL 0.25 0.13 0.49 0.13 0.21 0.03 0.22 0.17
log(GDP/Capita) 7.02 1.30 8.92 5.43 7.06 1.44 9.09 5.34
Intermediate Regime:
DWL 0.33 0.33 1.29 0.05 0.29 0.21 0.95 0.05
log(GDP/Capita) 7.58 1.08 9.67 5.64 7.42 1.15 9.78 5.44
Floating Exchange Rate
DWL 0.30 0.22 0.79 0.06 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.04
log(GDP/Capita) 7.73 1.11 9.82 5.55 7.63 1.19 9.84 5.47
Table 2: Summary Statistics.
21Explanatory Variables
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
Exchange Rate -0.027∗∗ -0.037∗∗ -0.033∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.09∗ -0.13∗
Regime (2.063) (2.232) (1.978) (2.590) (1.976) (2.095)
log(GDP/Capita) 0.089∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.096 0.071 0.115∗
(3.003) (2.812) (2.861) (1.649) (1.511) (2.002)
Openness 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(2.702) (3.810) (3.510) (2.639) (3.810) (2.423)
log(Size) 0.019 0.016 0.019 0.069
(1.014) (0.854) (1.014) (1.173)




R2 0.47 0.49 0.52 0.38 0.49 0.60
adj. R2 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.21 0.43 0.31
SE 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.16 0.19
Sample Size 38 38 38 15 15 15
Table 3: Regression Results (De Jure Classiﬁcation): Columns (1)-(3) all countries; (4)-(6) upper
middle income economies). Note: Dependent variable: Domestic Wage Level. Time period 1983-
98. t-Statistics in absolute values. *** Signiﬁcance at the 1, ** at the 5, * at the 10 percent
Level.
Explanatory Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exchange Rate -0.004 -0.005 -0.008 -0.038∗∗ -0.045∗ -0.054∗
Regime (0.612) (0.651) (0.996) (2.127) (1.762) (1.846)
log(GDP/Capita) 0.085∗∗ 0.082∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.123∗ 0.105∗ 0.144∗
(2.605) (2.624) (2.873) (1.875) (2.029) (2.033)
Openness 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.0009 0.001 0.0003
(2.458) (3.123) (2.952) (0.712) (1.394) (0.203)
log(Size) 0.005 0.004 0.032 0.038
(0.309) (0.251) (0.791) (0.834)




R2 0.44 0.44 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.59
adj. R2 0.39 0.37 0.40 0.31 0.30 0.29
SE 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.20
Sample Size 38 38 38 15 15 15
Table 4: Regression Results (De Facto Classiﬁcation): Columns (1)-(3) all countries; (4)-(6)
upper middle income economies). Note: Dependent variable: Domestic Wage Level. Time
period 1983-98. t-Statistics in absolute values. *** Signiﬁcance at the 1, ** at the 5, * at the 10
percent Level.
22